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Shelter the Federal Urban
American Way Housing Policy,
1900-1980
Ronald Dale Karr
American urban housingpolicy hasfeatured subsidies for the suburban middle class and
parsimonious spendingfor the urban poor. The outlines of this policy took shape during
the Progressive Era: acceptance ofthe capitalistic market economy, supportfor the deserv-
ingpoor needing temporary help, toleration ofracial segregation, and the designation of
overcrowding as the single most important urban problem. Progressive housing reformers
championed stricter housing codes and model tenements, but housing conditions for the
urban poor showed little improvement.
The U.S. government avoided direct involvement in housing until the early 1920s, when
itpromoted local zoning legislation. Under the New Deal, the government aided the private
housing industry, but housingfor the urban poor was not addressed until the passage of the
WagnerHousingAct in 1937, which authorizedfederalfunds forpublic housing. Although
the worstfeatures ofpublic housing had been improved by the 1970s, the legacy of limited
funding, racism, and the beliefthat subsidized housingfor thepoor should not compete
with private-sector middle-class housing kept millions ofAmericanspoorly housed.
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of
the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require . . . the
realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and suitable living
environment for every American family.
— Housing Act of 1949
The upsurge in urban homelessness in the 1980s was yet another confirmation of
the failure of American housing policy to achieve the goal of decent shelter for
all its citizens. Despite decades of affluence and aggressive eradication campaigns,
slums persisted, made even more frightful by drug-related violence. Millions contin-
ued to inhabit these dangerous neighborhoods.
In 1980 nearly two thirds of all Americans owned their homes— about twice the
rate of Western Europe. At the same time, according to Kenneth Jackson, "public
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housing accounted for only about one percent of the United States housing market
[but] it comprised 46 percent of the market in England and Wales, and 37 percent of
the French housing market." 1 Widespread home ownership for the suburban middle
class and parsimonious spending on public housing for the urban poor are but two
aspects of federal urban housing policy.
Progressivism and the Beginnings of Housing Reform
Direct federal involvement in urban housing was a product of the New Deal, but a
national policy had its origins a generation sooner. As early as the 1820s, many in the
middle and upper classes had been troubled by urban poverty. Most of these city resi-
dents, the products of villages or farms, keenly felt the loss of the moral order of the
communities in which they had been raised. Reformers launched religious revivals and
Sunday schools, and later, parks, playgrounds, and organized charities, all in hope of
redeeming the urban masses. The reformers attributed poverty to moral defects, such
as intemperance, laziness, or stupidity (or even Catholicism), in the poor themselves.2
The modern American housing movement emerged at the end of the nineteenth
century as part of the great wave of reform, the Progressive movement. New York,
the nation's largest city, was home to the republic's most notorious slums. Hideously
overcrowded blocks of five- and six-story tenements, most with only primitive sanita-
tion, housed more than a million people on Manhattan. Housing crusaders, led by
Jacob Riis and Lawrence Veiller, sought to stop the construction of new slums
through building codes and to force slumlords to upgrade existing tenements
through housing regulations. Although previous reformers had passed a tenement
law by 1867, shortcomings in the act itself and lax enforcement made it ineffective.
In 1901 the reformers finally put through a much stronger law and obtained the
means to enforce it. 3
Other housing reformers, taking a different tack, proposed that philanthropic
individuals and organizations construct model tenements incorporating high design
and construction standards. These would then be leased at the prevailing rents,
giving the tenants more for their money and providing a moderate (4 to 6 percent)
profit for the owners. A number of cities saw such projects constructed in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century. Model tenements would directly provide better
housing for their fortunate occupants and, more important, by example pressure
other builders to construct to the same standard. 4
By 1910 the various housing reformers of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago,
and other large cities were beginning to operate in concert. That year the National
Housing Association was founded, with New York's Lawrence Veiller as its director,
to encourage cities to investigate slum conditions and enact housing and building
codes. Others, with less formal organization, promoted the model tenement.5
The Progressive housing movement does not seem to have been particularly con-
troversial; indeed, apathy appears to have been its most serious opponent. 6 The wide
acceptance— or at least toleration— of these housing reformers contrasts sharply
with the intense controversy their successors have generated from the New Deal to
the present. The most probable reason for the support the movement enjoyed is that
Progressive views on the housing problem were shared by vast segments of the
American middle class.
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The ideological assumptions of the Progressives are worth examining, since
they continued to influence later generations of housing reformers. Many of their
views have gradually been modified or abandoned, but echoes of them can be
heard today, and there is reason to suspect that much of the American public still
endorses these beliefs.
Capitalism
Although aware of its shortcomings, Progressives embraced free enterprise. They
sought to eliminate the waste and inefficiency that produced some of its more dam-
aging effects on society. They accepted the marketplace— if kept free of monopoly
and conspiracy— as an effective allocator of resources, and for the most part did
not believe that government should compete with private companies. Lawrence
Veiller rejected public ownership or even subsidies of housing. 7 Many of the
strongest supporters of Progressive urban reform, particularly at the local level,
were businessmen or corporate lawyers. 8
Progressives rejected the idea of laissez-faire, believing that businesses, like all
social institutions, should be subject to wholesome regulation. Many businessmen
agreed, hoping that the government could bring a stable and profitable order to the
chaotic competitive environment in which they operated. Even in the heyday of
laissez-faire, the late 1860s and 1870s, the older Whig-Republican idea that the gov-
ernment should promote, protect, and even subsidize private enterprise persisted,
and Progressives, often of Republican background, could live with this aid so long
as it promoted the general welfare. 9
Progressives were quick to attribute social problems to evil individuals instead of
holding the capitalistic system to blame. Muckrakers enraged Progressive audiences
with vivid accounts of greedy big businessmen contemptuous of the public weal.
Since slumlords caused slums, code enforcement for the recalcitrant and the exam-
ple of model tenements for the penitent would presumably eradicate the evil. 10
Poverty
Before the Progressive era, most reformers believed that poverty usually resulted
from individual depravity. In this they shared the popular view, which was, according
to Robert Bremner, that
poverty is unnecessary (for Americans), but the varying ability and virtue of men
make its presence inevitable; this is a desirable state of affairs, since without the
fear of want the masses would not work and there would be no incentive for the
able to demonstrate their superiority; where it exists, poverty is usually a tempo-
rary problem and, both in its cause and cure, it is always an individual matter. 11
The rapid growth of urban slums and the frightening depressions in post-Civil
War America made it increasingly difficult for reformers to hold on to this view. The
unhealthy slum environment itself might be a cause of poverty as well as a result. By
1900, reformers were shifting their efforts from reforming the individual to remak-
ing the social environment. It had long been recognized that some of the poor—
that is, virtuous widows— might not be responsible for their plight, but the numbers
of "deserving poor" were felt to be small. Now it began to be accepted that the bulk
of the poor were not fully responsible for their condition. The challenge was to iden-
777
New England Journal ofPublic Policy
tify and assist them without being generous to the point of corrupting their morals
and leaving them permanently dependent. 12
Progressives thus believed that most of the poor were potentially bourgeois, mem-
bers of what Lawrence Friedman has termed "the submerged middle class." 13 Improv-
ing the environment by rebuilding the slums, providing parks and playgrounds, and
eliminating saloons and prostitution would effectively end poverty, except for the
chronically vicious, who would be institutionalized. By 1910, however, some Progres-
sives were realizing that additional measures, such as social insurance, child labor laws,
and higher wages, would be needed, and that the elimination of poverty was more dif-
ficult than they had once believed. 14
Racism
The Progressive movement coincided with the high water mark of American racism.
Segregation swept the South, the disenfranchisement of black voters was nearly
complete, and lynchings and race riots occurred with sickening frequency. Pseudo-
scientific cant reached the point at which non-Anglo-Saxon Caucasians were held to
be racially inferior. With a few prominent exceptions, Progressives at least tolerated
segregation. Housing reformers would not actively strive for equal treatment of
minorities until well into the 1950s. 15
Congestion
Progressive housing reformers regarded overcrowding as the most serious single
urban problem. New York City tenements packed twenty-four families onto a
twenty-five-hundred-square-foot lot, and some parts of Manhattan were among the
most crowded spots on the planet. 16 As early as the 1840s, suburbanization was being
advocated as one solution for excessive residential density. 17
A half century later, suburbs bloomed and urban congestion remained, but the lure
of the fringe remained strong. "The metropolis of the future," the Massachusetts
Rapid Transit Commission forecast in 1892, would be "a city closely built, and during
the daytime densely populated, this surrounded by a semirural district, in which are
the homes of those who work in the city, but who pass their nights, and whose fami-
lies pass their lives, under the purer and healthier influences of the country." With
better transit even the workingman would be able to "abandon the unhealthy and
demoralizing life of the tenement-house, and obtain for himself and family the bene-
fits of a suburban home." 18 The pioneering urbanologist Adna Webber concluded his
monumental study, The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century (1899), by noting
that "the most encouraging feature" of recent years was "the tendency . . . toward
the development of suburban towns." 19
Not surprisingly, Progressives welcomed the automobile and championed the
Garden City movement, which proposed building new, low-density cities with lim-
ited populations. 20 Progressive housing reformers generally supported home owner-
ship and the single or two-family house as promoting the best middle-class values
and giving individuals a stake in the social order. Several model housing schemes
employed individual homes, detached or semidetached, instead of tenements. 21 Still,
most probably wondered if suburbanization would ever significantly reduce urban
density, as had Jacob Riis when he wrote in How the Other HalfLives (1890): "Work-
ingmen, in New York at all events, will live near their work, no matter at what sacri-
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fice of comfort— one might almost say at whatever cost, and the city will never be
less crowded than it is." 22
For all its efforts, the Progressive housing movement failed. The slums remained.
Negative reforms, such as tenement codes, raised the quality of new construction
and helped upgrade older units, but they could not significantly improve the stock of
urban housing. Rigid enforcement of the laws against overcrowding would literally
push people out into the street. Higher building standards meant higher costs and,
ultimately, higher rents. The dilemma was that increasing the quality of housing
threatened to reduce the quantity available, especially to the poorest residents. 23
The other Progressive housing measures, the model tenements, and the attempts
to improve the general neighborhood environment through parks, playgrounds, and
vice control, met with no greater success. Model tenements provided tenants with
quarters superior to what they otherwise could rent, but too few were ever built to
have much of an effect on the slums. Individual landlords, even if they had wanted
to, rarely had the financial resources to invest in large-scale model tenements. Most
slumlords were small operators, often immigrants themselves, not large institutions
or wealthy rentiers. As buildings deteriorated, there was a "filtering down" of land-
lords, as ever poorer landlords followed ever poorer tenants. 24
With all its failings, the Progressive housing movement had launched an effort of
great vigor whose effects have been felt ever since. The housing codes remained,
paving the way for such later regulations as zoning and subdivision control. Echoes
of the model tenement continue to be heard today.
The Emergence of Federal Housing Policy: The 1920s
In 1916, the city of New York enacted the nation's first zoning law. Zoning, which
originated in German cities around 1900, was adopted in New York following sev-
eral years of study, when fashionable Fifth Avenue merchants wanted to restrict the
spread of garment factories near their stores. In its sweeping restrictions on land use
it was the most radical departure from traditional American real estate practice to
that time. 25
This major break with laissez-faire was promoted by conservative business and
real estate interests seeking to stabilize the land market. Whatever potentially radi-
cal effects zoning might have had were curtailed when it was separated at birth from
the process of planning. Zoning was destined to become a tool of politicians, lawyers,
and land developers, not comprehensive planners. 26
The novelty of this new regulation in the nation's most important city could not
help but attract national attention, and the law's authors, like Lawrence Veiller, did
all they could to encourage other cities, large and small, to adopt zoning. In part
this was done in hopes of strengthening the city's position when the law faced its
inevitable court challenges. The Supreme Court was a bastion of traditional conser-
vatism, and despite the conservative intentions of the law, there were fears that the
Court would find that zoning constituted a taking, which would require compensa-
tion to property owners. 27
Until 1921, the federal government had only one brief involvement with housing.
During 1918 the government had constructed nearly 25,000 units of rental housing
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for war workers, but Congress ordered their sale shortly after the end of the fighting.
Staffed by imaginative architects and planners, the U.S. Housing Corporation and
the Emergency Fleet Corporation produced housing of a surprisingly high quality
and served as a direct inspiration for public housing advocates in the 1930s. 28 The
government's reinvolvement with housing began when Secretary of Commerce
Herbert Hoover sought to stimulate the real estate and construction industries by
setting up the Division of Building and Housing within the Bureau of Standards.
Hoover saw that housing prices put the average new house well beyond the budget
of the typical worker. His strategy was to help the construction industry reduce costs
through greater standardization of materials, which the government could encour-
age. He also discovered the New York-led zoning movement. 29
In 1921 Hoover named an Advisory Committee on Zoning, dominated by Veiller
and other New York zoners. The following year the committee issued its influential
Standard State Zoning EnablingAct, based heavily on the New York statute. The gov-
ernment sold more than 55,000 copies, and a year later nearly a dozen states had
enacted similar laws. 30
With the official endorsement of the federal government, zoning spread from
coast to coast. By the end of the decade nearly eight hundred cities and towns had
adopted zoning. 31 This popular acceptance doubtlessly played a part in the somewhat
surprising decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1926 when, in Euclid v. Ambler, by
a 6 to 3 vote, it upheld zoning. In its decision, written by ultraconservative Justice
George Sutherland, the Court endorsed the idea that multifamily housing (which
it termed commercial) ought to be excluded from single- and two-family resi-
dential districts.
The development of detached house sections is greatly retarded by the coming of
apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section
for private house purposes ... In such sections very often the apartment house is
a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and
attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district. More-
over, the coming of one apartment house is followed by others . . . bringing . .
.
the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupa-
tion, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of larger portions of the
streets, thus detracting from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of
quiet and open spaces for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities—
until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as
a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. 32
With a seal of approval from the judicial branch of the federal government, zoning's
future was assured. 33
By promising stability for investors, zoning helped rationalize real estate and
stimulated housing, as well as helping to launch the great speculative construction
boom that finally helped bring down the entire economy in 1929. 34
Housing and the New Deal
As secretary of Commerce for two weak presidents, Herbert Hoover was largely
responsible for federal economic policy in the 1920s, and he reaped the results as
president in the early 1930s. Once the severity of the Depression became known,
attempts were made to prop up the construction and banking industries, but to little
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avail. By 1933, when Hoover left office, half the mortgages in the country were in
default, and a thousand properties were being foreclosed daily. 15
In this atmosphere of deep crisis, the administration of newly elected Franklin D.
Roosevelt was able to make an unprecedented intervention into the home financing
system. On June 13, 1933, the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) was cre-
ated to refinance existing home mortgages in danger of foreclosure. More than a
million mortgages were written. The HOLC pioneered the use of the long-term,
self-amortizing mortgage (hitherto, the typical home mortgage was from five to ten
years, with a balloon payment due at the end, usually requiring periodic refinancing). 36
A year later, on June 27, 1934, President Roosevelt signed the National Housing
Act, which created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). "No agency of the
United States government," observed Kenneth Jackson, "has had a more pervasive
and powerful impact on the American people over the past half-century." The FHA
was intended to stimulate the moribund housing industry by insuring new mort-
gages. It was one of the most successful of all New Deal measures: housing starts,
which nearly doubled between 1937 and 1941, zoomed after the end of World
War II; "Between 1934 and 1972, the percentage of American families living in
owner-occupied dwellings rose from 44 percent to 63 percent." And for this the
FHA could well take credit: by 1972 it had insured over 11 million mortgages.
Taking the long-term, self-amortizing mortgage from the HOLC, it also promoted
minimum home construction standards that swept the home-building industry.37
Most new housing after 1937 was in the suburbs, which often were unprepared
for the enormous growth the FHA directed their way. But the FHA was a veritable
disaster for older cities, which received few FHA-guaranteed loans. Taking its cue
from the Progressive housing reformers the FHA was partial to the owner-occupied,
single-family house and far readier to insure loans for them than for multifamily
rental properties. With a nod to home builders, the FHA made it easier to buy new
homes than to rehabilitate older ones. And most important, the FHA based its deci-
sions on whether to insure a mortgage on factors that discriminated against houses
in older built-up areas. The FHA openly endorsed racial segregation until the 1950s
and generally refused loans to areas characterized by "inharmonious racial or
nationality groups"; its Underwriting Manual "read like a chapter from Hitler's
Nuremberg Laws." 38 The resulting "redlining"— in which certain urban neighbor-
hoods were written off as too risky for loan guarantees— became self-fulfilling
prophecy, as private lenders followed the lead of the FHA and shut off credit,
making it virtually impossible for applicants to get mortgages for rehabilitation or
building loans. 39
Until World War I, builders constructed new housing for all income levels, from
mansions to tenements, but after 1920 they concentrated on the top half— or even
top third— of the market by income groups, where profits were greatest. By 1935
the slums were not simply crowded and poorly maintained but also old; new tene-
ments had not been built in nearly a generation. 40 Although such Progressives as
Lawrence Veiller had rejected publicly subsidized or owned housing, by 1919 a few,
like Edith Elmer Wood, began calling for governments to construct low-income
housing and clear slums. In the 1920s, Wood joined up with Clarence Stein, Lewis
Mumford, and others of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA),
some of whom had designed government-built war housing in 1918, in helping to
launch organizations to lobby for legislation. 41
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Most of the early housing efforts of the New Deal in Roosevelt's first term
(1933-1936) were aimed at propping up particular industries— such as homebuild-
ing, real estate, and banking. Of a rural background, Roosevelt had only limited per-
sonal knowledge of and interest in urban issues. Low-income-housing advocates had
little success in securing government support. The National Industrial Recovery Act
(NIRA) of 1933 authorized the Publics Works Administration (PWA) to build public
housing and clear slums, but only a limited number of units were produced under
this emergency legislation. Intense lobbying efforts by advocates such as Woods and
Catherine Bauer secured strong support from organized labor and at last won the
reluctant endorsement of the president. Following his triumphant reelection in 1936,
Roosevelt endorsed a housing bill previously introduced by Senator Robert F.
Wagner of New York. Large majorities of both houses of Congress passed the legis-
lation, and the president signed the Housing Act on September 1, 1937. 42
The Wagner Act set the pattern followed by subsequent housing legislation.
Under its provisions the U.S. Housing Authority was established to subsidize local
housing authorities. These locally organized and controlled bodies borrowed money
from the federal government to build public housing units. Tenant rent covered out-
of-pocket operating costs while annual subsidies from Washington paid off the loans.
This reliance on rent payments, as Lawrence Friedman noted,
would . . . tend to restrict public housing to the honest, working poor. Dependent
families, families with no incomes, and problem families would usually be too
poor for public housing. . . . The projects would mainly be filled with deserving
but underpaid workers— innocent victims of economic reverses, who need a
"break" to tide them over the lean years. 43
At the same time, upper-income limits kept out those who could afford private
housing, thus deferring the government from competing with the private sector. To
prevent extravagance, conservatives had tacked on a requirement that costs not
exceed $4,000 per unit ($5,000 in large cities). Finally, the act provided for the old
Progressive goal of slum clearance by requiring that for each unit constructed a unit
of substandard housing be eliminated. Thus the overall housing stock would not
increase, but at a time when many buildings were vacant due to lack of tenants who
could afford the rent, this did not seem unreasonable. 44
Between 1937 and 1941, the U.S. Housing Authority funded 300 projects resulting
in 130,000 units of new low-income housing. At the same time, 79,000 units of older
substandard housing were demolished or upgraded. Although these projects were
large in overall size, one- to three-story buildings were the norm (only a small frac-
tion contained buildings with more than five floors). Unlike the crowded tenements
they replaced, the new housing featured open space, playgrounds, and meeting
rooms. Housing reformers like Wood and Bauer were able to influence design stan-
dards and operating policies to support the family life of the poor. 45
Later legislation and changes in administrative procedures would modify this ini-
tial housing policy, often for the worse, making the shortcomings of public housing
painfully obvious. But in retrospect the Wagner Act itself was deeply flawed. The
law's construction cost limits reflected in part the traditional American attitude
toward charity, inherited and transmitted by the Progressives, that dependency must
be discouraged. Boston's Josephine Shaw Lowell, in 1884, put it succinctly: "Relief
should be surrounded by circumstances that shall . . . repel everyone, not in extrem-
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ity, from accepting it."46 Congress, explained Lawrence Friedman, "did not want
its public housing, any more than its jails, to be luxurious. Congress wanted public
housing to act as a way station for the temporarily dispossessed; it was to be a 'slum
of hope,' but without peeling plaster and nauseous privies."47 Millions of working-
class American taxpayers who were ineligible for public housing would have been
outraged to see poorer people enjoying better quarters at their expense. 48
These attitudes virtually assured that American public housing would be unat-
tractive, if not repulsively grim. Public housing had to look like public housing.
Unfortunately, Congress attempted to limit "luxury" features by clamping down
on construction costs, apparently not realizing that amenities in fact made up a
relatively minor part of overall development expenses. The result was to encourage
builders to reduce basic construction quality, not simply skip "frills." Thus the
Wagner Act was a blueprint for dreary, cheaply built structures housing a transient
population striving to escape the stigma of charity by leaving as quickly as possible.49
No wonder that most neighborhoods and communities would as soon embrace
public housing as a prison or a pesthouse.
Realizing that public housing might prove unpopular, Congress made it entirely
voluntary. Any municipality could reject it altogether by simply failing to establish a
housing authority, and for those which did want some subsidized housing, the local
authority, not the federal government, decided where it would go. In Chicago, for
example, each alderman had veto power over projects in his ward. In addition, by
requiring that one unit of substandard housing be eliminated for each constructed in
the same community, the law guaranteed that public housing could never be built on
cheaper vacant land on the urban fringe but only in the older inner-city neighbor-
hoods where the poor already lived. 50
The entry of the United States into World War II in December 1941 brought an
end to the initial phase of federally funded public housing construction. New low-
income housing projects were canceled as priorities shifted, as they had in World
War I, to housing war workers. The New Deal was over, but its housing legacy—
particularly the FHA and the Wagner Act— would have a powerful effect on the
shape of the nation after the war.
From the Fair Deal to the Great Society
In 1945 the nation faced an acute housing shortage. The overheated war economy
had left Americans flush with cash, which they were anxious to spend on houses,
cars, and other goods. The government rewarded the 16 million war veterans (and
voters) with the Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944 (the GI Bill), which, among
other things, created the Veterans Administration (VA). The VA worked in close
association with the FHA to guarantee mortgages for ex-servicemen, and it adopted
the latter's policies. Together the FHA and the VA helped finance the construction
of millions of units of new housing, mostly single-family and in the suburbs. Mass-
market building techniques and low-interest loans brought monthly costs of new
homes below average rents. 51
At least partly as a result of these policies, the cities were losing their middle
classes to the burgeoning suburbs. Former residents of public housing were leaving
for the vacated middle-class urban neighborhoods or even the suburbs themselves.
At the same time, poor rural migrants, particularly southern blacks, Puerto Ricans
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and other Hispanics, and Appalachian whites, were seeking shelter in the old
urban slums.52
This put administrators of public housing in a dilemma. Public housing was
intended to serve as temporary quarters for the "submerged middle class," the
hard-working poor on their way to respectability, not as permanent homes for the
lowest-income poor. Yet it was this underclass that was most in need of a place to
live, at a time when the prewar tenants could afford to leave. The inevitable result
was a major shift in tenant selection policy whereby welfare recipients came to con-
stitute an increasing proportion of public housing occupants. 53
At the same time, the return to prosperity in the 1940s eroded political support
for public housing. Federal funding for new nondefense housing projects ended in
1942, and an increasingly conservative Congress would not authorize resumption of
the program. President Harry Truman made federal aid for housing part of his Fair
Deal program, but the capture of Congress in 1946 by conservative Republicans gen-
erally hostile to public housing put the program on the defensive. In a surprising
move, Senator Robert Taft, a conservative Republican from Ohio, agreed to sponsor
housing legislation acceptable to the Truman administration. But passage of this bill
had to wait until after Truman's unexpected election victory in 1948, which again
produced a Democratic Congress.
After four years of effort, the so-called Taft-Ellender-Wagner Housing Act was
signed by President Truman on July 15, 1949. It officially committed the nation to
"the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family." The public housing program of the Wagner Act was revived, with 810,000
units of housing authorized for the next six years (this provision had survived the
House of Representatives by only five votes). Finally, it authorized a massive pro-
gram of urban redevelopment.54
Slum clearance had been a major objective of housing reformers since the Pro-
gressives, but demolishing blighted areas appealed to many with scant interest in
housing for the poor. Real estate interests, bankers, and businessmen were dismayed
to watch their investments in urban land go sour, while urban planners dreamed of
rebuilding cities. Public housing advocates, realizing that removing slums was far
more popular than rehousing the poor, saw no choice but to link the two, including
in the housing bill a slum clearance measure originally written by the real estate
lobby so hostile to public housing. Title I of the 1949 Housing Act authorized cities
to create Urban Redevelopment Authorities armed with powers of eminent domain
to condemn blighted areas. They would acquire the properties, demolish the build-
ings, and resell the land, below cost, to private developers. 55
Title I, along with its successor, the 1954 Housing Act (in which urban redevelop-
ment became urban renewal), changed the face of urban America. Unfortunately,
the poor gained little from the massive rebuilding that occurred. The law attempted
to link redevelopment to housing by requiring that redevelopment projects be con-
fined to currently residential districts or areas that would become so after develop-
ment. But it did not require that any new housing result. Developers could— and
did— tear down residential neighborhoods and replace them with stores, luxury
hotels, and even parking lots. What housing was built through redevelopment was
usually too expensive for displaced residents. And sometimes the demolished neigh-
borhoods, like the West End of Boston, were not even slums, just older areas that
became attractive to well-connected developers.56
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Politics in the 1950s was dominated by conservatives, most notably President
Dwight Eisenhower. Public housing was under constant attack in Congress. Eleven
years after Congress authorized 810,000 units of public housing, it had voted funds
for only 322,000. 57 With funding limited, housing administrators sought to cut con-
struction costs. Most prewar projects were one to three stories high; now, soaring
land costs and dwindling appropriations made the high rise symbolic of public hous-
ing. 58 As part of the 1949 act, housing administrators were forbidden to discriminate
against welfare recipients (although racial discrimination was permitted), and public
housing tenants increasingly were among the poorest of the poor. 59 Meanwhile,
urban renewal, along with highway construction in the wake of the Interstate High-
way Act of 1956, displaced large numbers of the poor without providing sufficient
replacement housing. The remaining slums became more crowded, and derelict
buildings were given new leases on life. 60
By the early 1960s, critics, conservative and liberal, assaulted public housing.
Catherine Bauer, one of the prime movers behind the Wagner Act, noted angrily,
in 1957, that "life in the usual public housing project is not the way most American
families want to live."61 "Low-income projects," Jane Jacobs wrote in her influential
The Death and Life of Great Cities (1961), have "become worse centers of delin-
quency, vandalism, and general social hopelessness than the slums they were sup-
posed to replace." 62 Various pieces of housing legislation were enacted to correct
some of the worst abuses, but the basic system remained unchanged. Although
Democratic, the Kennedy administration did not establish a strong low-income
housing program. The general unpopularity of housing projects kept new subsi-
dized housing units to only 24,000 a year during the Kennedy years, fewer than
under Eisenhower. 63
On becoming president in 1963, Lyndon Johnson attempted to implement a
second New Deal, which he styled the Great Society. Urban housing was not a high
point on his original agenda, but the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965,
which he put through Congress after his smashing electoral victory, authorized
60,000 new units of public housing a year for four years, more funds for urban
renewal, and a new program of rent supplements for poor individuals to subsidize
rents in private housing. (LBJ had wanted this to go to the working poor ineligible
for public housing, but Congress restricted it to only those eligible for public hous-
ing. After authorizing the program, Congress blocked funding for it owing to fears
that it would bring public housing to white suburbs.) Johnson also obtained long-
sought recognition for housing problems when the cabinet-level Department of
Housing and Urban Development was approved by Congress in 1965.64
Beginning that same year, insurrection swept the ghettos of America's largest cities,
the worst riots occurring in the summer of 1967 in Detroit and Newark and, after the
assassination of Martin Luther King, in 1968. With an urban crisis clearly at hand,
Johnson was able to get Congress to pass another housing bill. The Housing Act of
1968 authorized an incredible 600,000 units of low-income housing (using the same
basic funding scheme as in previous housing acts) for the next three years. In the first
year, Congress appropriated money for only 100,000 units, still a sharp increase over
previous years. It also set up two alternatives to traditional public housing: rent subsi-
dies for limited dividend profit-making or nonprofit developments (Section 236) and an
attempt to promote home ownership by mortgage payment subsidies (Section 235). 65
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The war in Vietnam derailed the Great Society, along with the political career of its
author. Because of the programs put in place, however, the greatest construction surge
of new subsidized housing occurred during the first administration of Richard Nixon.
In 1970, more than 90,000 units of conventional public housing were added, along with
nearly 120,000 rent-subsidized units and 150,000 Section 235 mortgages. The surge
was short lived. On January 8, 1973, just after Nixon buried George McGovern in the
1972 presidential election, the administration announced a freeze on all housing pro-
grams pending further study. Nixon was then at the height of his popularity, the urban
crisis attitude of the 1960s had faded, and austerity was in the air. 66
By 1973 some of the worst features of low-income housing policy had been addressed.
Since 1966 the FHA had aggressively sought urban mortgages and redlining decreased
(critics charged, however, that this merely made it easier for whites to flee the city). 67
High rises were out of fashion, and the new emphasis was on smaller "scatter-site" pro-
jects located away from the ghetto. Rent-subsidized projects could include mixtures of
subsidized and market-rent units. But the negative image of three decades of American
public housing could not be shaken. In 1972, newspapers from coast to coast carried
photos of the demolition of St. Louis's notorious fifteen-year-old Pruitt-Igoe project.
At the same time, reports surfaced of widespread abuses involving FHA and Section
235 mortgages.68
In 1974, shortly before his resignation, Nixon canceled his freeze on new housing
projects. One of the first acts of his successor, Gerald Ford, was to sign the Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974, the only major housing legislation of the
decade. Under this act the subsidy of private construction programs was renamed
Section 8 and broadened. After a year and a half of the freeze on housing programs,
low-income housing construction resumed, but it never reached the peak of the
early Nixon years.
By the time Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, subsidized Section 8 projects had
almost entirely succeeded conventional public housing. Unlike his liberal Demo-
cratic predecessors, Carter did not seek new housing initiatives. Stymied by a stag-
nant economy, Carter was anxious to restrain federal expenditures, and the number
of subsidized units declined. By 1979 the bulk of the new low-income housing was
earmarked for the elderly, such projects having proved acceptable even in suburbia.
Only a small portion of what remained of the low-income program was available to
low-income urban families. 69 The cumulative effect of decades of urban renewal
and the failure to provide sufficient amounts of quality low-income public housing
were having a devastating impact on the urban poor. With affordable housing ever
scarcer, homelessness was on the rise, a process that became even more critical after
Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981. 70
In 1964, the New York Times observed that "traditionally, housing bills have been an
uneasy compromise between the demands of the private real estate industry and the
moral claims of the slum-dwellers, the elderly and the minority groups, with Congress
usually more responsive to the former than to the latter." 71 Until well into the 1960s,
housing advocates directly descended from the initial Progressive reformers spoke
for the consumers of public housing. Federal housing policy was a constant struggle
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involving the president and executive agencies, Congress, and the courts, with lobby-
ists from many quarters and public opinion hovering in the background.
The basic Progressive tenets, widely held among the American middle class,
guided that policy. Dispersal of population was good, at least for the middle class;
federal policy helped middle-class whites move to suburbia while increasingly isolat-
ing the minority poor who remained behind in the cities. Public housing never really
had a reasonable chance of success. It was expected to be an improvement over the
slums, but without frills that would corrupt the character of its tenants or excite the
envy of taxpayers; it had to be repulsive enough to discourage long-term occupancy,
yet somehow foster a sense of community among its transient occupants; it was
intended for the short-term working poor, but sited, designed, administered, and
funded to become the permanent home of the very poor.
Early housing reformers rarely considered the problem of the "undeserving poor"—
drug addicts, single mothers dependent on welfare, alcoholics, foreigners unwilling
to learn English, criminals, and the chronically lazy. Public housing, designed for
others, ended up taking these individuals in because our system had made no other
provision for them and because often no one else wanted to live there.
Federal housing policy, of course, is not a story of unrelieved disaster even for the
poor. Hundreds of thousands of people took shelter in public housing, and many
projects, particularly more recent smaller ones, were well run. Still, the failure after
more than half a century to develop a satisfactory housing policy inspires scant con-
fidence that the narrower problem of homelessness will ever be addressed effec-
tively by our federal government.^
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